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Case No. 20100726-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
RONDALD DEAN UDY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from his sentence for securities fraud, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-16, -21 (West 2000), and 
false statements in a securities document, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-16, -21 (West 2000). This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court violate Defendant's double jeopardy rights where 
it imposed only one sentence? 
Standard of Review. Whether a trial court ruling violates double 
jeopardy is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, f 12, 
218P.3d610. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2. Did the trial court violate Defendant's rights to allocution and due 
process when it first allowed allocution, continued sentencing to allow 
Defendant to pay restitution, then ended the discussion when Defendant 
himself said that he had not paid restitution? 
Standard of Review. This Court ordinarily reviews whether a trial court 
violated rule 22(a) (codifying the common law right of allocution) and due 
process for correctness. See State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f 9,31 P.3d 
615, affirmed in part by 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amendments V & IV; 
Utah Const, art. I, § 12; 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (WestSupp. 2010); 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West Supp. 2010); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22; 
Utah R. Civ. P. 58A. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant appeals from a sentence imposing the statutory term of 
imprisonment on convictions for securities fraud and false statements on a 
securities document. See Br. Aplt. at 1. The State charged Defendant with 
four felony counts: two counts of securities fraud, second degree felonies, 
and one count each of false statements on a securities document and sales by 
an unlicensed broker-dealer or agent, third degree felonies. See R. at 1-3. 
Defendant issued dozens of promissory notes to dozens of victims, in 
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violation of state securities laws, thereby fraudulently obtaining 
approximately $15,000,000, misstated or concealed material facts such as his 
obligations to repay several outstanding notes already issued in violation of 
the Securities Act, the fact that the Division had revoked his securities license, 
potential conflicts of interest, and various risk and suitability factors. See R. 
at 7-12; 176-196. 
Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State, wherein the 
State dismissed one count of securities fraud and the unlicensed dealer count, 
and Defendant pleaded guilty to the remaining charges. See R. 125-141 
(Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea in Abeyance). The trial court 
held these pleas in abeyance, conditioned on, among other things, Defendant 
obeying all securities laws. See id. 
As part of the plea in abeyance agreement, Defendant agreed to repay 
all current identified note holders, which totaled dozens of victims. See id. 
See also R. at 176-96 (Defendant's Motion to Exclude Victim Impact 
Statements, identifying victims). Although the original charges extended to 
only a handful of named victims, Defendant later conceded that the dozens 
of note holders, who had not been named as victims in the original charges, 
constituted victims for purposes of restitution. See R. at 224. 
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Nine days after entering his plea in abeyance, Defendant violated the 
terms of the agreement by soliciting further investment funds from one of the 
victims in his criminal case. See R. at 144. Defendant solicited $50,000 from 
that victim, after having previously defrauded her out of $242,667 and 
having failed to return the investment. See R. at 144. On the State's motion 
and after an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered Defendant's guilty 
pleas and convictions. See R. at 142-146; 167. 
The court held two hearings on sentencing, one in May and one in 
August. See R. 287 (Tr. of 3 May 2010 hearing), 288 (Tr. of 3 August 2010 
hearing). At the May hearing, the trial court heard evidence and argument 
from Defendant, his counsel, the prosecutor, and extensive comments from > 
Defendant's many victims. See generally R. 287'. The trial court received a 
presentence investigative report from Adult Probation and Parole, which 
recommended the statutory indeterminate prison term. See R. 174. In 
response to this recommendation, Defendant and his attorney presented 
< 
argument and testimony that Defendant had the ability to repay the victims 
with the proceeds of a multi-million dollar investment deal that would 
shortly close. See R. 287:46-50. 
Defendant claimed that he had "been dedicating 80 some odd hours a 
week . . . for several years now" to bring this business deal to conclusion; that < 
-4-
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it was an "art project'' wherein he "matched them up with banks who are 
getting together to fund it;" that the commission amounted to $15 million; 
that the total project amounted to $600 million in value; that it was taking so 
long because he had never done a project like this and "rather than taking the 
asset right to the investors or the banks, we have had to get an insurance 
wrap on it," which "kind of guarantees the asset of the investment to the 
bankers;" that "I'm kind of a middle man" and "I've referred them to the 
right people." R. 287 at 7-10. 
The trial court at first indicated an intent to proceed with sentencing: 
"I'm ready to sentence him." Id. at 51. The trial court then announced a 
sentence that included a prison term of 1 to 15 years for the second degree 
felonies and zero to 5 years on the third degree felony. Id. But the trial court 
then immediately "stay[ed] imposition of that sentence" and stated an 
intention to "make him do a year in jail," followed by 36 months' probation. 
Id. The court then set the matter for "review" in August 2010, to allow 
Defendant an opportunity to collect his promised commissions and repay the 
victims. Id. In setting that date, the trial court asked Defendant how much 
time he needed to close the deal and pay restitution. See id., at 50-51. 
The trial court stated that Defendant would "do the year regardless," 
because the sentence should include "a little punitive aspect." Id. The trial 
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court stated that it was "really skeptical" whether Defendant could actually 
pay the approximately $15,000,000 in restitution within the few weeks 
Defendant had asked for. Id. at 53. Although the court thought Defendant's 
promises "sound[] like a lot of hot air," it nevertheless gave him the time he 
asked. Id. It did so primarily at the request of several victims who spoke on 
his behalf, some of whom believed they stood a better chance of being repaid 
if Defendant had time to complete his business deal. See id. The trial court 
finally stated, "if the money's not there, he's at least going to jail, and he may 
go to prison." Id. 
The trial court did not enter any sentence after the first hearing. 
Rather, it issued an unsigned minute entry outlining the proposed prison 
sentence and stating that the "prison term is suspended." R. 224-25. The 
unsigned minute entry did not accurately reflect the court's statements at the 
hearing in that it applied jail only to one count, and did not mention 
probation at all. Cf. id., with R. 287:53. 
At the August hearing, Defendant's attorney informed the trial court 
that Defendant "has not been able to obtain the funds . . . to make substantial 
restitution payments." R. 288:1. Counsel then provided the court with a 
letter and an e-mail purporting to detail the status of the business deal that 
Defendant had promised would allow him to pay full restitution. Id. Trial 
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counsel then argued that immediate incarceration would impede Defendant's 
ability to close the deal and pay restitution. Id. at 2. At that point, the trial 
court stopped counsel and stated, "It's over. It's over." Id. The court 
commented on Defendant's inability to pay restitution as promised, stating "I 
don't believe this. I just don't believe it." Id. Then the court allowed the 
prosecutor to respond to Defendant's submissions and argument. Id. at 2-3. 
The prosecutor agreed with the court that Defendant's documents lacked 
credibility. See id. at 3. The prosecutor then commented on Defendant's 
lengthy history of promising to pay restitution but not following through. 
See id. Defense counsel tried to comment further, but the trial court ended 
the discussion: "No, no, no. We're not talking any more." Id. 
The trial court then stated "I said jail time. I've revisited this in my 
head . . . . He's going to prison to be taken forthwith . . . . " Id. Counsel for 
Defendant reminded the court of its earlier intention to suspend the prison 
sentence and impose jail instead. Id. at 4-5. The trial court listened to 
counsel's arguments regarding jail versus prison. See id. Counsel did not 
object to the prison commitment on double jeopardy grounds. Counsel 
argued only that the trial court had previously allowed a "discount" from a 
jail sentence if Defendant had paid some restitution by the time of the second 
hearing. See id. at 3-4. The trial court corrected counsel's misunderstanding, 
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saying "no discount. I didn't say discount/' Id. at 5. The court reiterated 
that it had given Defendant time to pay restitution, that Defendant had lied 
about the deal and could not pay restitution as promised, and that Defendant 
therefore did not deserve a more lenient sentence. See id. The same day, the 
trial court entered a signed minute entry imposing the statutory prison terms. 
R. 228-29, 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 233. He also filed in the 
trial court a written motion under rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, urging the court to "honor its original sentence." R. 235 (Rule 22 
Motion to Correct Sentence). Defendant's memorandum argued that the 
May hearing constituted Defendant's final sentence, that the August hearing 
constituted a review hearing of that sentence, and that payment of restitution 
prior to the review hearing wras clearly not a term of probation or 
prerequisite to receiving the benefit of the prior sentence. See R. 239-40. 
Defendant reasoned that the imposition of prison was an illegal sentence 
because it constituted a procedurally improper "sentence revision." Id. at 
239. Defendant never asserted that the imposition of sentence after the 
August hearing violated double jeopardy. The trial court has not ruled on 
Defendant's rule 22(e) motion. 
-8-
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For the first time on appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court's 
sentencing at the August hearing violated double jeopardy because it 
imposed prison— a harsher sentence — after the court had already 
pronounced a more lenient sentence—jail and probation. There was no 
double jeopardy violation, however, because sentence was imposed only 
once — after the second sentencing hearing. A trial court violates double 
jeopardy when it increases a sentence already finally imposed; it cannot 
violate double jeopardy the first and only time it imposes sentence. 
Defendant therefore had no legitimate expectation of finality in the 
trial court's statements in May about the sentence it intended to impose. 
Moreover, the trial court told Defendant at the May hearing to expect a 
different outcome in August if he did not pay restitution before then. The 
August hearing thus constituted a continuation of the May sentencing 
hearing, and nothing about the trial court's actions or words would lead a 
reasonable defendant to expect otherwise. Without such an expectation, 
double jeopardy does not prohibit sentencing at the August hearing. 
Defendant has not shown his right to allocute was violated when he 
did in fact allocute. Defendant and his counsel were given free rein to speak 
at the May hearing. In fact, it was Defendant's representations that he could 
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pay restitution if given enough time that convinced the judge to consider 
probation and to hold off imposing sentence in May. Although the trial court 
did cut off counsel's arguments at the August hearing, it cut off argument 
only related to Defendant's excuses why the deal did not go through, and 
presumably a request for yet more time to pay. The trial court, however, had 
already given Defendant the opportunity to present a full mitigation 
argument at the May hearing. The trial court was not required to give 
Defendant another opportunity to rehash what had already been decided. 
In any event, Defendant has not demonstrated that he suffered any 
harm from his inability to continue further allocution because he has not 
shown what else he had to say, nor has he shown that anything he would 
have said would have made any difference in the outcome at sentencing in 
August. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant brings two challenges to his sentence, imposed at the 
August hearing. First, he argues that the imposition of prison violated 
double jeopardy because it constituted an increase from the sentence he 
received at the May hearing. See Br. Aplt. at 17. Second, he argues that the 
sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because the trial court did not 
allow him to allocute at the August hearing. See id, at 32. 
-10-
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Defendant preserved neither claim below. He seeks to circumvent the 
preservation rules by challenging his sentence as illegal under rule 22(e), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, claiming that the sentence is "'manifestly 
or patently illegal.'" Br. Aplt. at 31 (citing State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, \ 9, 
232 P.3d 1008). Rule 22(e) provides that a "court may correct an illegal 
sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal mariner, at any time." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(e). 
Assuming, without conceding, that rule 22(e) provides a remedy for 
violations of double jeopardy at sentencing, Defendant has not demonstrated 
a double jeopardy violation. 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY RIGHTS BECAUSE IT STAYED 
IMPOSITION OF THE SENTENCE AT THE MAY HEARING 
AND THEREFORE DID NOT CREATE A LEGITIMATE 
EXPECTATION OF FINALITY 
Defendant argues that imposition of the prison sentence at the August 
hearing violated his rights against double jeopardy embodied in both the 
federal and Utah constitutions.1 See Br. Aplt. at 17. The August sentence did 
1
 Although Defendant cites case law for the proposition that the Utah double 
jeopardy clause offers greater protection than its federal counterpart, see Br. 
Aplt. at 19, he does not articulate the scope or operation of that greater 
protection or demonstrate that, as applied to this case, the Utah Constitution 
offers protection that the federal provision would not. See State v. Van Dyke, 
2009 UT App 369,1f 17 n.4,223 P.3d 465, cert, denied, 230 P.3d 127 (Utah 2010) 
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not violate double jeopardy because (1) the trial court entered only one 
sentence; and (2) the tentative sentence discussed at the May hearing could 
not have given rise to a legitimate expectation of finality. 
A. Double jeopardy prohibits resentencing after a prior sentence 
gives a defendant a legitimate expectation of finality. 
The double jeopardy clause provides: "[N]or shall any person be 
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . . " 
U.S. Const, amend. V. In the context of sentencing, this clause provides 
"protection against multiple punishments for the same offense/" State v. 
Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, f 36, 218 P.3d 610 (quoting Bernat v. Allphin, 2005 UT 
1, f 11,106 P.3d 707); see also State v. One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Eight 
Hundred Dollars, 942 P.2d 343, 349 (Utah 1997); State v. Maguire, 1999 UT App 
45, Tf 7,975 P.2d 476. 
But "'[sentencing procedures traditionally receive less double 
jeopardy protection than do prosecutions/" and even "'resentencing per se 
does not implicate the double jeopardy protection from multiple 
(requiring state constitutional analysis to demonstrate "how the court's 
analysis . . . would differ from its consideration under the federal 
constitution"). Moreover, his constitutional analysis proceeds solely under 
the federal analysis. The State therefore likewise presents only a federal 
constitutional analysis. "In the absence of a separate and distinct argument 
under the Utah Constitution," this Court should consider "Defendant's 
claims only under the Federal Constitution." State v. Despain, 2007 UT App 
367,112,173 P.3d 213. 
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punishments/7 Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 11, (citation omitted) (alteration 
in original). The lynchpin of the double jeopardy inquiry in sentencing is the 
existence of a legitimate expectation of finality of an original sentence. See 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117,136-37,101 S. Ct. 426 (1980) (the double jeopardy 
clause protects the finality of criminal judgments and prohibits alterations to 
sentences carrying a legitimate expectation of finality); Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, 
f 36 ("7[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause only proscribes resentencing where the 
defendant has developed a legitimate expectation of finality in his original 
sentence/77) (quoting Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, f 8) (additional quotation 
omitted); see also United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("If a 
defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in [his] 
sentence is prohibited by the double jeopardy clause. If, however, there is 
some circumstance which undermines the legitimacy of that expectation, 
then a court may permissibly increase the sentence.77). 
B. Because the trial court entered only one sentence, double 
jeopardy is not implicated. 
The trial court explicitly stayed imposition of the sentence at the May 
hearing. Although it initially indicated an intent to proceed with sentencing 
at the May hearing, see R. 287:51 ("I'm ready to sentence him.77), and 
announced a prison sentence, it then immediately 77stay[ed] the imposition of 
that sentence.77 Id. This fact alone prevented jeopardy from attaching, as 
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demonstrated below, and the sentence imposed in August was the first and 
only sentence that Defendant ever received. 
The tentative sentence discussed at the May hearing was not final 
because the trial court declined to enter a final judgment of conviction and 
sentence. A judgment is entered when it is signed by the judge and filed 
with the clerk. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(c). It is well-established that an 
unsigned minute entry is not a final judgment. See Ron Shepherd Ins. v. 
Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 (Utah 1994). Jeopardy does not attach to a sentence 
announced in an unsigned minute entry where the trial court expressly 
declines to impose final sentence pending review of further information. See 
State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, f f 23-25,17 P.3d 1145 (stating "the 
requirement of a final signed order signals that the court has issued its final 
decision on sentencing and jeopardy attaches at that point to preclude further 
modification of the sentence"). 
Defendant argues that he legitimately expected finality in the jail 
sentence, but as shown, the trial court did not in fact impose a jail sentence. 
Indeed, it did not impose any sentence at all at the May hearing. The trial 
court's entire discussion of jail or prison at the May hearing turned on 
whether Defendant had paid restitution by the August hearing, see R. 287:51-
53, and the court did not commit Defendant to jail or place him on probation. 
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See R. at 224-25. Defendant could not legitimately expect finality in a 
sentence that the trial court did not in fact impose. 
The trial court's retention of jurisdiction over the sentence, and the fact 
that it did not enter a signed judgment, prevented jeopardy from attaching to 
the tentative May sentence. See Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, ^ 25 ("A trial court 
may . . . change an oral sentencing decision when it has specifically reserved 
that option pending receipt of further information relevant to sentencing and 
the sentencing decision is not binding on the court until a final written order 
is entered/7). Defendant concedes that the trial court retained jurisdiction 
over the sentence when it did not enter a signed judgment. See Br. Aplt. at 
26. He argues only that his expectation of finality prohibited the court from 
later entering judgment contrary to that expectation. See id. at 26-27.2 But 
Defendant could have had no legitimate expectation of finality where the 
2
 Defendant cites State v. Todd for the proposition that '"the date of the 
oral announcement of the sentence to the defendant is the date of imposition 
of sentence for all purposes/" Br. Aplt. 27 (citing 2006 UT 7, \ 8 & n.2,128 
P.3d 1199). Todd is inapposite here because it dealt with the very narrow 
question of when sentence is "imposed" for purposes of establishing the 
jurisdictional time limit for filing a motion for new trial and did not consider 
the question of when jeopardy attaches to a sentence. See id. Rather than 
looking to appellate jurisdiction case law, this Court should look to Horrocks, 
a double jeopardy case, for the proper framework for analyzing when 
jeopardy attaches to judgments. See generally, 2001 UT App 4. 
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trial court retained jurisdiction over sentencing and did not enter a signed 
judgment until after the August hearing. See Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, f 25. 
C Even if the unimposed May sentence were considered, 
Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of finality in 
the announced, but unimposed sentence. 
Defendant claims he formed a legitimate expectation of finality in the 
sentence discussed at the May hearing, despite the fact that the trial court did 
not actually impose sentence. See Br. Aplt. at 26-27. But any expectation 
Defendant formed was not legitimate because it was contradicted by the trial 
court's words and actions at the May hearing. Indeed Defendant's counsel 
below demonstrated that he understood the contingent nature of the May 
sentence. Defendant could not form a legitimate expectation of finality in a 
sentence that the trial court did not enter. 
It is true that the trial court did indicate the possibility of jail and 
probation; but that indication clearly amounted to the minimum amount of 
time Defendant would serve, depending on the outcome of the August 
hearing. The court stated that Defendant would "do the year regardless," 
because the sentence should include "a little punitive aspect." R. 287:51. The 
trial court added that it was "really skeptical" whether Defendant could 
actually pay the approximately $15,000,000 in restitution within the few 
weeks Defendant had asked for. Id. at 53. And although the court thought 
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Defendant's promises "sound[ed] like a lot of hot air," it nevertheless gave 
him the time he asked to pay restitution. Id. The trial court finally stated, "if 
the money's not there, he's at least going to jail, and he may go to prison!' Id. 
(emphasis added). On the same day, the court issued an unsigned minute 
entry outlining the prison sentence and indicating that the "prison term is 
suspended." R. 224-25. Even if the unsigned minute entry did not alone 
determine that the judgment was not final for double jeopardy purposes, it 
nevertheless rebuts the legitimacy of Defendant's expectation of finality 
because it gave further indication that the trial court did not intend its 
tentative May sentence to be final. Simply put, the trial court did everything 
it reasonably could to prevent its May sentence from becoming the final 
judgment, and any contrary expectation Defendant formed was not 
legitimate in light of the court's words and actions. 
1. Defendant did not in fact hold an expectation of finality 
because the trial court told him he could go to prison, and 
the record demonstrates he understood that. 
In addition to refraining from imposing a final sentence, the court told 
Defendant that the sentence proposed at the May hearing depended entirely 
on Defendant's subsequent behavior and that the sentence would be finally 
decided in August. See R. 287:51-53. The trial court told Defendant he might 
be sent to prison should he not pay restitution by August. See id. at 53. And 
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Defendant's trial counsel stated at the August hearing that he understood 
that whether or not Defendant received any incarceration depended on 
whether Defendant had paid restitution by that date. See R. 288:2. Although 
Defendant hoped for imposition of jail rather than prison at the August 
hearing, see id. at 4, the fact that he knew that the sentence would not be 
imposed until the trial court received further information regarding his 
promised deal undercuts his claim that he subjectively expected finality from 
the May sentence. 
Defendant now argues that "he legitimately understood that he would 
remain on probation, but would serve a year in jail." Br. Aplt. at 29. But the 
trial court never placed him on probation; the unsigned minute entry from 
the May hearing said nothing about probation; and the judge's statements 
regarding probation referred to future probation after serving some 
commitment. R. 287:51. Defendant therefore could not legitimately have 
understood he was placed on probation at the May hearing, that restitution 
was a condition of probation, or that the August hearing amounted to a 
revocation of that probation. 
Defendant incongruently argues that imposition of the previously-
announced jail term after consideration of further information would not 
have violated double jeopardy, but that imposition of the previously-
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announced prison term after consideration of further information did. See Br. 
Aplt. at 29. Whichever way Defendant now wishes to characterize his 
expectations after the May hearing, he knew that the May sentence was not 
final. He therefore cannot demonstrate a violation of double jeopardy. 
2. Because Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of 
finality in the May sentence, the August sentence did not 
violate double jeopardy. 
Absent a legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence, double 
jeopardy does not bar the imposition of an increased sentence. See Rodrigues, 
2009 UT 62, f 39 (absent legitimate expectation of finality in sentence not 
accurately reflecting plea agreement, subsequent increase in restitution 
arising from correction of error did not violate double jeopardy protections); 
Maguire, 1999 UT App 45, % f 8-12 (defendant who voluntarily withdrew 
guilty plea had no legitimate expectation of finality in original proceedings, 
and subsequent increase in sentence did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause); 
see also DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 139 (absent legitimate expectation of finality in 
original sentence, commencement of sentence did not prevent subsequent 
increase in sentence under statute); United States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063,1066 
(10th Cir. 1992) ("When a second sentence imposed on resentencing is more 
severe than the original sentence, the relevant double jeopardy analysis 
requires that we ask whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of 
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finality in his original sentence[;]" if not, the increase in sentence did not 
implicate double jeopardy concerns) (emphasis added); see also Romero v. 
People, 179 P.3d 984, 989-90 (Colo. 2007) ("[DJouble jeopardy does not bar the 
imposition of an increased sentence if the defendant lacked a legitimate 
expectation of finality in the sentence/'); People v. Adams, 128 P.3d 260,261 
(Colo. App. 2005) ("punishment for a criminal offense can be increased 
without violating the double jeopardy protections . . . when a defendant has 
no legitimate expectation of finality in his or her sentence"); Sentence Review 
Panel v. Moseley, 663 S.E.2d 679, 683-84 (Ga. 2008) (where statute provided for 
modification of sentence after imposition, sentence was not final, no 
expectation of finality arose, and double jeopardy did not preclude 
subsequent increase in sentence); State v. Gefroh, 458 N.W.2d 479,483 (N.D. 
1990) (absent legitimate expectation in finality of sentence, subsequent 
imposition of harsher sentence not prohibited by double jeopardy). 
Nothing in the character of the trial court's actions or statements in 
May would have led a reasonable person to expect finality. The record, read 
in its entirety, clearly demonstrates that the trial court was not finished 
sentencing Defendant in May, and Defendant himself knew that. At 
Defendant's own request, the trial court afforded him time to make one final 
effort to pay restitution before deciding the question of incarceration. See R. 
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287:49-50. The trial court never stated that jail would commence after the 
August hearing depending on whether Defendant had paid restitution; 
rather, it stated that even if Defendant had paid restitution, "he's at least 
going to go to jail, and he may go to prison." R. 287:53. Defendant may have 
gotten his hopes up that the trial court would impose only jail if he did not 
pay restitution by August, but that is a far cry from a legitimate expectation 
of finality given the trial court's pronouncements. 
In short, viewing the record in its entirety, the August hearing 
constituted a continuation of the May sentencing hearing. The trial court 
waited until it received all pertinent information, and reluctantly indulged 
Defendant's far-fetched and ultimately unfulfilled promises, before 
pronouncing a final judgment. See R. 228-29 (Minutes, Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment, signed by judge). Defendant could not legitimately expect 
finality from a sentencing proceeding only half-completed. Without that 
legitimate expectation, the double jeopardy clause did not prohibit the 
sentence entered in August, and Defendant's claim fails. 
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II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE DEFENDANT'S 
RIGHT OF ALLOCUTION BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT 
AFFORDED HIM A FULL AND FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO 
PRESENT HIS MITIGATION CASE AND ADDRESS THE 
RELEVANT ISSUES 
Defendant argues that the trial court violated his right to allocute at the 
August hearing by "repeatedly interrupting] defense counsel when he 
attempted to speak/' and by denying "defense counsel the 'opportunity to 
address the court and present reasonably reliable and relevant information in 
the mitigation of a sentence/" Br. Aplt. at 36 (quoting State v. Wanosik, 2003 
UT46,1f23,79P.3d937).3 . 
3
 Defendant also complains that, at the August hearing, the trial court 
did not ask if there was any legal reason not to proceed with sentencing and 
did not allow defense counsel to raise any inaccuracies in the presentence 
report. See Br. Aplt. at 36. However, at the May hearing the trial court 
verified with defense counsel that there was no legal reason not to proceed 
with sentencing, and defense counsel addressed the presentence report. See 
R. 287:3-4. Thus, the trial court did comply with the dictates of rule 22(a) and 
Defendant's arguments lack merit. 
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Whether this Court considers Defendant's allocution claim under rule 
22(e),4 under the plain error doctrine, or as a preserved claim, the record 
demonstrates that he did allocute at both the May and August hearings. He 
presented a complete case in mitigation, and provided comment on the 
relevant evidence at the August hearing. At some point, a trial court may 
decide that it has received enough argument and evidence and may rule, 
despite a defendant's desires to present more. And even if the sentencing 
court erred by interrupting defense counsel at sentencing, Defendant has not 
established prejudice resulting from that error. He must show, but has not, 
that he would have provided the sentencing court with evidence or argument 
that would have resulted in a more favorable outcome. He has not identified 
what he would have said that would have justified a more lenient sentence. 
4
 Rule 22(e) does not provide a ground for appellate review of 
Defendant's allocution claim: "Rule 22(e) is not properly invoked for 
ordinary or 'run-of-the mill' errors/' such as "a denial of due process 
resulting from a trial court's failure to consider mitigating evidence." 
Candedo, 2010 UT 32 at f 9 n.2, 232 P.3d 1008 (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted). See also State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, f 15, 84 P.3d 
854 (holding claims that trial court failed to consider proper statutory factors 
at sentencing were not claims of "patently" or "manifestly" illegal sentence, 
and thus not cognizible under rule 22(e)). 
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A, Defendant allocuted at the May hearing by presenting his 
overall case for mitigation, and he presented and commented 
upon all evidence received at the August hearing. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by "repeatedly 
interrupting] defense counsel when he attempted to speak" and by denying 
defense counsel "the 'opportunity to address the court and present 
reasonably reliable and relevant information in the mitigation of a sentence/" 
Br. Aplt. at 36 (quoting Wanosik, 2003 UT 46 at f 23). Defendant further 
argues that the trial court erred because it did not affirmatively afford him 
the opportunity to personally address the court. See id. 
Viewed as a whole, the record demonstrates that Defendant and 
counsel did allocute. x\s demonstrated in Point I, above, the August hearing 
was merely a continuation and conclusion of the sentencing hearing that 
began in May. At the May hearing, defense counsel assured the court that 
"we're ready to proceed with sentencing." R. 287:3. The court asked, "So 
there's no legal reason why we ought not to proceed with sentencing?" Id. 
Counsel replied, "No, Your Honor." Id. Before receiving statements from 
several of Defendant's victims, the trial court asked counsel, "Do you have 
anything you'd like to say on [Defendant's] behalf before sentencing?" Id. at 
4. Counsel then addressed the court, both making a case in mitigation and 
discussing Defendant's efforts to make restitution. See id. at 4-8,14-15. 
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Counsel addressed AP&P's prison recommendation. See id. at 4. At times, 
the sentencing judge engaged counsel in dialogue, allowing him to address 
specific concerns that the court had regarding Defendant's restitution 
obligations and his ability to pay. See id. at 4,5, 8. The court then invited 
Defendant himself to address the restitution concerns, and allowed 
Defendant to make a plea for leniency. See id. at 8-14. The court received 
extensive comment from multiple victims, followed by comments by the 
prosecutor. See id. at 14-46. The court then engaged defense counsel once 
again in dialogue regarding Defendant's ability to pay restitution. See id. at 
46-51. Defendant concedes that he allocuted fully at the May hearing. See Br. 
Aplt. at 35. 
After the parties all said everything they had to say, the court 
announced its tentative sentence, before continuing the matter to allow 
Defendant time to pay restitution: "I'm going to give him that time frame and 
if the money's not there, he's at least going to go to jail, and he may go to 
prison." Id. at 51-53. Thus, the single question to be answered at the August 
hearing was whether Defendant paid restitution. There was nothing left to 
be discussed in mitigation of sentence. Defendant would either pay 
restitution or he would not. 
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At the August hearing, Defendant provided the court with evidence 
that he did not pay restitution. The trial court stated, "Give me the bad 
news." R. 288:1. Defense counsel informed the court that Defendant had not 
paid restitution, and provided the court with documents purporting to show 
the status of the multi-million dollar deal Defendant was allegedly close to 
completing, which would provide the funds to pay restitution. See id. at 1-2. 
He also stated that if the court took Defendant into custody, that deal would 
fall through. See id. at 2. Only then did the trial court interrupt counsel, 
saying "give me a break. I gave him a drop dead date and I let him tell me 
how long it would take.. . . It's over. It's over." Id. Counsel attempted to 
comment further, but the court cut him off. "No, no, no, it's over." Id. And 
later, "No, no, no. We're not talking any more. Enough's enough.... He's 
going to prison . . . . " Id. at 3. 
While it is true that the trial court interrupted and cut off counsel's 
ability to provide further argument about whether or not Defendant should 
be given more time to close his alleged multi-million dollar deal, that did not 
violate Defendant's right to allocute. The right to allocute encompasses the 
right "to provide the defendant personally with an opportunity to address 
the court" and "to ensure that the judge is provided with reasonably reliable 
and relevant information regarding sentencing." Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, f 19. 
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In other words, rule 22(a) "codifies the common-law right. . . to make a 
statement in mitigation/7 Id. at f 18. Here, Defendant and counsel both 
made extensive arguments in mitigation at the May hearing. Nothing 
changed between the May and August hearings. 
The August hearing was set to answer a single question: Did 
Defendant pay restitution. The answer, provided by Defendant himself, was 
•"no." With that answer in hand, the sentencing court was ready to impose 
final sentence, and did so. The setting of the August hearing did not provide 
Defendant with the unlimited right to reopen his case in mitigation and re-
allocute. At the May hearing, he asked only for time to pay restitution. He 
was granted that time, but did not deliver. The trial court acted well within 
its discretion by allowing no further comment regarding whether or not 
Defendant should be given yet more time to close his multi-million dollar art 
deal. This is especially true given Defendant's history of dishonesty with the 
State Securities Division, his dozens of victims, and the court itself. The 
sentencing judge had a history of Defendant promising one thing and then 
doing another. See R. 125-141 (Statement of Defendant in Advance of Plea in 
Abeyance, wherein Defendant promised to pay restitution and to cease 
illegal securities trading); R. at 144 (detailing Defendant's securities 
violations, mere days after promising to receive no further violations); R. 
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287:50 (Defendant promising to pay approximately $15,000,000 in restitution 
within 60 days); R. 288:1 (Defendant informing the court he had not paid 
restitution). 
The trial court concluded from Defendant's extensive track record that 
Defendant was lying from the outset regarding his multi-million dollar deal 
and his ability to pay restitution. See id. at 4. Thus, any reasons Defendant 
could have proffered to explain either the impending payoff, or in further 
mitigation of his failure to pay, would not have been believable. In other 
words, the time for mitigation had ended. 
Defendant has offered no authority, and the State could find none, that 
provides defendants the unlimited right to continue allocuting for as long as 
they wish. To the contrary, Defendant vindicated his right to allocution once 
he provided "the judge . . . with reasonably reliable and relevant information 
regarding sentencing,'7 and made "a statement in mitigation or explanation/7 
Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, | | 18-19. The trial court afforded Defendant and his 
attorney ample time at the May hearing to address all the relevant issues, and 
despite misgivings, indulged Defendant to allow him time to procure funds 
to pay restitution. 
In sum, the record as a whole demonstrates that Defendant had ample 
opportunity to allocute. The trial court did not sentence Defendant to prison 
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because it did not listen to what he had to say; it sent him to prison because it 
could not believe what he had to say. Because Defendant did in fact allocute, 
the trial court did not err. 
B. Any error was harmless because Defendant has not 
demonstrated what additional information he would have 
provided at the August hearing or that the outcome would 
have been different. 
Even if Defendant had shown error, he has not shown harm. See State 
v. Young, 853 P.2d 327,361 (Utah 1993) (applying harmless error analysis to 
denial of allocution claim in death penalty case); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (" Any 
error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial 
rights of a party shall be disregarded/'). A defendant demonstrates harm by 
showing that, "absent the error, there is a substantial likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome." State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170,174 (Utah App. 1992). 
The only harm Defendant argues is the "increase" from a one year jail 
term to an indeterminate prison sentence. See Br. Aplt. at 39-40. He claims 
that when "the trial court held a proper sentencing hearing in which the 
rights to allocution and due process were protected," the trial court imposed 
jail; but when "the trial court violated [Defendant's] right to allocution and 
due process" the trial court imposed prison. Id. As demonstrated above, 
however, the trial did not impose jail at any time. It discussed jail, and even 
offered Defendant a way to obtain that leniency. But it withheld final 
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judgment until all relevant information came in, and when it became clear by 
Defendant's own admission that he had not paid restitution, the court 
sentenced him to prison. The trial court did not "increase" Defendant's 
sentence. 
Defendant does not argue that the trial court violated his right to 
allocute by sentencing him in August; rather, he argues that the trial court 
sentenced him without allowing him to finish speaking. See Br. Aplt. at 36. 
Thus, to find harm in the trial court's actions, this Court cannot simply 
compare the sentence Defendant actually received to the tentative one the 
trial court suggested in May. Instead, Defendant must show that the trial 
court likely would have entered a more lenient sentence in August, after 
receiving word of his failure to pay his victims, and after allowing further 
comment by counsel and Defendant himself. 
But Defendant does not so much as proffer what further argument or 
evidence he would have provided had the trial court allowed him to do so, 
nor does he demonstrate that the court would have been compelled to 
believe such argument or evidence, given his extensive track record of 
dishonesty and lack of follow-through. In short, Defendant has offered no 
reason to believe that the trial court would have, in its discretion, treated him 
-30-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
more leniently if it had only allowed him to say more. Thus, Defendant has 
not demonstrated prejudice as the result of any error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 19 October 2011. 
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-31-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on r j October 2011, two copies of the foregoing brief 
were • mailedHibhand-delivered to: 
Lori Seppi (9428) 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
A digital copy of the brief was also included:-® Yes • No 
MTU^(-V^ tfhAMA 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
